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What Happens Next: Metaphor in Disaster
Recovery Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of a natural disaster, we routinely ask—and
attempt to answer—What happened? And then we turn to What
happens next? The first question we answer with facts, statistics, and
narrative. The second question requires an answer that is less
definite, more abstract. To understand the abstract—in this case,
answering What happens next? after a natural disaster—we employ
metaphor to describe and promote recovery efforts. Metaphor
creates a perception of what the recovery will look like, how it will
be accomplished, and what the ultimate result will be. By invoking a
specific metaphor, government officials, media outlets, and citizens
emphasize certain aspects of recovery over others, 1 drawing attention
to what they consider priorities or encouraging a specific attitude in
the recovering community.
This Comment will first provide an overview of metaphor and
how it applies in the disaster recovery context. It will then consider
two specific metaphors for disaster recovery—one historical and one
contemporary—to examine how metaphor can both help and hinder
disaster recovery. Finally, this Comment will discuss resilience, a term
often used when discussing disaster recovery, but rarely recognized
for what it is—a metaphor. This Comment argues that by
acknowledging resilience as a metaphor, the varying definitions and
perceptions of resilience will become more useful to understanding
disaster recovery.
II. THE NECESSARY METAPHOR: DISASTER AND RECOVERY AS
REIFICATION
In a world driven by science, technology, and the media, we
answer the question What happened? with facts, statistics, and

1. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex
Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 230 (1995) (“[Metaphors] structure
the way we perceive reality, and they structure it in a way that chooses to emphasize certain
parts of our experience at the expense of others.”).
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narratives, establishing the contours of a disaster. . Consider, for
example, the image tracking of Hurricane Sandy by both the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and
NASA, which gave us a detailed description of how the Superstorm
began as a tropical wave off the coast of Africa on October 11, 2012,
developed into a tropical depression moving across the Caribbean
Sea by October 20, became Tropical Storm Sandy on October 22,
and accelerated into Hurricane Sandy on October 24. 2 As Hurricane
Sandy made its way towards the east coast of the United States, it
joined with a nor’easter storm, morphing into what some called a
Frankenstorm. 3 While NASA and NOAA tracked the pending
disaster from afar, government at all levels—city, state, and federal—
began to prepare. On October 28, 2012, President Obama signed
emergency declarations for Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, making federal
funds and support available to state governments in anticipation of
the hurricane making landfall the next day. 4 When Hurricane Sandy
made landfall in New Jersey on October 29, government officials,
news stations, and social media were all able to report not just
where, but how the Superstorm had arrived. 5
A natural disaster, however, is more than a hurricane or another
catastrophe in nature; it is the catastrophe’s interaction with and

2. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA), Service Assessment:
Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy, October 22–29, 2012, SERVICE ASSESSMENT 8–9 (May
2013) [hereinafter NWS Service Assessment] http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/
pdfs/Sandy13.pdf; Two Years Later: NASA Remembers Hurricane Sandy, NASA (Oct. 29,
2014), https://www.nasa.gov/content/goddard/two-years-later-nasa-remembers-hurricanesandy/index.html#.VFbzEPnF-So.
3. Daily Mail Reporter, How Frankenstorm was created: Hurricane Sandy’s clash with
vicious nor’easter made for once-in-a-lifetime event, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2012,
11:05 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2224629/Hurricane-Sandy-path2012-How-Frankenstorm-created.html#ixzz2nuawmoPA (“‘The total is greater than the
sum of the individual parts,’ said Louis Uccellini, the environmental prediction chief of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration meteorologists about the dramatic
weather.”); Bryan Walsh, Frankenstorm: Why Hurricane Sandy will be Historic, TIME (Oct.
29, 2012), http://science.time.com/2012/10/29/frankenstorm-why-hurricane-sandywill-be-historic.
4. Hurricane Sandy: Timeline, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandytimeline (last updated July 24, 2014, 4:00 PM).
5. See Id. FEMA’s webpage also gives a complete timeline of government action taken
before, during, and after Hurricane Sandy.
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effect on human populations. 6 To answer What happened? requires
more than just knowing how the catastrophe arrived; it also
requires an accounting of the catastrophe’s effect on human
populations. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, government,
news media, and social media all rushed forward with answers,
establishing the contours of the disaster. Across the Atlantic basin,
there were at least 234 deaths caused by Sandy. 7 In the United
States, seventy-two people were killed directly—by floodwaters,
falling trees, and other hurricane-related causes—and eighty-seven
were killed indirectly, by the after-effects of the storm, including
hypothermia and carbon monoxide poisoning. 8 Sandy was the
second-costliest hurricane in U.S. history, causing over $65 billion
in damage. 9 Although the storm ran along the East Coast and made
landfall in New Jersey, Sandy ultimately affected twenty-four states
with flooding, blizzards, strong winds, and resulting power
outages. 10 For the first time since 1888, the New York Stock
Exchange was closed for two days in a row. 11 The information
about Hurricane Sandy, from the wind-span of the storm (about
1,000 miles in diameter) 12 to the number of people seeking refuge
from the storm to the names of the dead and the stories of the
survivors, gave answers to What happened? in specific scientific,
statistical, and narrative terms. As the numbers, names, and stories
of Hurricane Sandy were collected and recorded, the contours of
the natural disaster, though complicated, became concrete. 13

6. FEMA, NATIONAL DISASTER RECOVERY FRAMEWORK: STRENGTHENING
DISASTER RECOVERY FOR THE NATION 81 (2011), http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/20130726-1820-25045-5325/508_ndrf.pdf (defining a “Major Disaster” as “any
natural catastrophe . . . of sufficient severity and magnitude to [cause] damage, loss, hardship
or suffering).
7. Eric S. Blake et al., Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy (AL182012) 22–29
October 2012, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER 1 (Feb. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf (“There were at least 147 direct
deaths recorded across the Atlantic basin due to Sandy, with 72 of these fatalities occurring in
the mid-Atlantic and northeastern United States.”). Id. at 14 (“At least 87 deaths . . . were
indirectly associated with Sandy or its remnants in the United States.”).
8. Id. at 14.
9. Id. at 1.
10. NWS Service Assessment, supra note 2, at 1.
11. Blake, supra note 7, at 18.
12. NWS Service Assessment, supra note 2, at 1.
13. John Friedlander, Abstract, Concrete, General, and Specific Terms,
GRAMMAR . CCC . COMMENT. EDU , http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/compositi

153

JENKINS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

2015

The concrete answers to What happened? are a natural starting
place to answer the inevitable follow-up question, What happens
next?, which necessarily encompasses both short- and long-term
recovery. Although many of those answers will become concrete—
federal funding, insurance payouts, restoration of electricity and
transportation—they are, in fact, abstract, inherently ambiguous
ideas 14 that lack physical references. 15 President Obama’s speech to
the Red Cross the day after Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New
Jersey illustrates the difference between concrete and abstract
language. He first described what had happened during the storm
with concrete images—what people had been able to see:
[D]uring the darkness of the storm, I think we also saw what’s
brightest in America. I think all of us obviously have been shocked
by the force of Mother Nature as we watch it on television. At the
same time, we’ve also seen nurses at NYU Hospital carrying fragile
newborns to safety. We’ve seen incredibly brave firefighters in
Queens, waist-deep in water, battling infernos and rescuing people
in boats. 16

President Obama then followed with more abstract language, an
idea of what would happen next:
This is a tough time for a lot of people—millions of folks all across
the Eastern Seaboard. But America is tougher, and we’re tougher
because we pull together. We leave nobody behind. We make sure
that we respond as a nation and remind ourselves that whenever an
American is in need, all of us stand together to make sure that
we’re providing the help that’s necessary. 17

Although President Obama was able to describe Americans as
“tough” and a people who “pull together . . . . leav[ing] nobody
on/abstract.htm (defining “concrete” language as “objects or events that are available to
the senses).
14. Nat’l Ctr. for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP), Earth Inst., Colum. Univ., From the
Directors: Sandy Recovery a Year Later, HURRICANE SANDY, OCTOBER 2012,
http://ncdp.columbia.edu/microsite-page/hurricane-sandy-october-2012/sandy-recovery-1year-later (“Predictably, the answers are ambiguous. There is no single ‘recovery snapshot’ or
data repository to which to turn, and the answers one gets to those questions [about whether
recovery has been achieved] depends on who is being asked.”).
15. Friedlander, supra note 13.
16. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the American Red Cross (Oct. 30,
2012, 2:18 PM) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/10/30/remarks-president-american-red-cross).
17. Id.

154

JENKINS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

151

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

What Happens Next: Metaphor in Disaster Recovery Policy

behind,” what those descriptions meant in the days following
Hurricane Sandy was still abstract, without concrete evidence of
what response and recovery would look like.
This does not mean that abstract ideas cannot be described or
even understood. To understand the abstract, language turns to
metaphor. 18 The simple definition of metaphor is a “comparison
made by referring to one thing as another,” 19 which Aristotle, the
first to write extensively on metaphor, described as presenting
“similarity in dissimilars.” 20 By comparing an abstract idea, such as
disaster recovery, 21 to a concrete idea, the abstract takes on the form
and language of the concrete. Through metaphor, what was vague or
unimaginable is reified—it comes into focus and can be
conceptualized as a concrete reality.
After Hurricane Sandy, the aftermath was compared to the
aftermath of other disasters, including Hurricane Katrina, 22 that
people knew the facts of and could build expectations around. It
was also compared to less obvious and more conceptual concrete
ideas. New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg described what
would happen next as “the road to recovery,” using a familiar
image and metaphor of moving forward. 23 U.S. Senator Kristen

18. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue “that metaphor is pervasive in everyday
life, not just in language, but in thought and action.” George Lakoff & Mark Johnson,
Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language, 77 J. OF PHIL. 453, 454 (1980). This paper does
not dispute that argument, and in fact agrees with it, but argues that metaphor is essential,
taking on a key role in decision making, after a natural disaster.
19. Gideon Burton, Silva Rhetoricae: The Forest of Rhetoric, RHETORIC.BYU.EDU
http://rhetoric.byu.edu/Figures/M/metaphor.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2007).
20. Mark Johnson, Metaphor: An Overview, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AESTHETICS:
METAPHOR (Michael Kelly ed., 2008) (quoting ARISTOTLE, POETICS 1459a (c. 350)), available
at http://www.oxfordreference.com.erl.lib.byu.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195113075.001
.0001/acref-9780195113075-e-0351.
21. For a discussion of how a natural disaster may be the abstract idea compared to the
concrete idea of war and terrorism, and how that metaphor changes our perception of natural
disasters, see Lisa Grow Sun and RonNell Andersen Jones, Disaggregating Disasters, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 884 (2013).
22. See Seth McLaughlin, Chris Christie: Superstorm Sandy recovery is just beginning in
New
Jersey,
THE
WASHINGTON
TIMES
(Oct.
29,
2013,
7:25
AM),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/29/chris-christie-superstorm-sandynew-jersey/ (New Jersey Governor Chris Christie on effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav
on federal funding for Hurricane Sandy).
23. Press Release, NYC Office of Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Updates New Yorkers on
City
Response
to
Hurricane
Sandy
(Oct.
31,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/i
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Gillibrand and other government officials compared the rebuilding
and recovery to a fight, letting their constituents know that it
would not be easy. 24 One year after Hurricane Sandy, the directors
of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia
University employed the image of watermarks on the houses left
behind in the wake of Sandy and the ongoing interior destruction
of houses by mold and other damage as a metaphor for the
aftermath and recovery process as a whole. 25
With each metaphor, a new understanding of the aftermath of a
natural disaster and the recovery process is formed. 26 The metaphor
of the road, as previously stated, encourages moving forward and
establishes a destination, while the metaphor of the fight may
suggest struggle, but also power and tenacity. The metaphor of the
watermarks and mold left in homes evokes both the lingering effects
of the disaster and the difference between what the casual observer
sees—the faint watermarks—and what those intimately connected to
the disaster know—the mold and damage. 27
Metaphors, however, are not as simple as stating that two
things are similar. In placing the ideas next to each other, the
dissimilarities also become apparent—in other words, to say that
one thing is “like” another thing is to admit that the two things are
not identical. 28 By taking into consideration how the abstract idea is
unlike the concrete idea, new perceptions of the abstract idea can
be formed. 29 After Mayor Bloomberg compared recovery after
Hurricane Sandy to a road, he somewhat humorously expounded
his metaphor, stating, “Today our streets have too much traffic.
ndex.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.go
v%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr384-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.
24. Press Release, New York State, Governor Cuomo Holds Meeting with New York’s
Congressional Delegation, Mayor Bloomberg and Regional County Executives to Review
Damage Assessment for the State in the Wake of Hurricane Sandy (Nov. 26, 2012), available
at http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/11262012-damageassessment.
25. Sandy Recovery a Year later, supra note 14.
26. “Metaphor . . . provides new ways of understanding experience.” Thornburg, supra
note 1, at 228.
27. Sandy Recovery a Year later, supra note 14.
28. See Allen Grossman, Summa Lyrica, in THE SIGHTED SINGER 249 (1992) (“What
is like cannot be identical. . . . The function of the particle like in metaphor (all metaphors
being reducible to some form of the sentence ‘A is like B’) is to enable the perception of a
relationship by distinguishing its terms.”).
29. See id. at 298 (“The condition which sustains metaphor, namely that the two terms
are not one, is the same condition which enables perception.”).
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Yesterday there was none, so I suppose that’s progress, unless
you’re driving.” 30 While the road metaphor depicted moving
forward towards a destination, the actual roads of New York City
had been brought to a near standstill without public
transportation, 31 a condition which could have altered New
Yorkers’ perception of recovery.
The significance of metaphor is not simply that a metaphor was
used, but that a specific metaphor was used, establishing and
defining the abstract concepts of disaster recovery. Just as a variety of
metaphors were applied to the Hurricane Sandy recovery, any
number of metaphors has been applied to disasters over time. In
order to understand the significance of a particular metaphor,
Sections II and III of this Comment each examine a metaphor, one
historical and one contemporary, respectively, before turning to the
importance of recognizing a familiar term in recovery—resilience—as
a metaphor.
III. THE HISTORICAL METAPHOR: RECOVERY AS “RISING FROM
THE ASHES”
In a span of thirty-five years, two burgeoning American cities,
Chicago and San Francisco, were destroyed by fire. For two days in
October of 1871, a small barn fire, propelled by strong winds and
fed by land parched from drought, became the Great Chicago Fire. 32
Three hundred people died and 100,000 people, nearly one-third of
the population, were left homeless. Nearly 18,000 buildings were
destroyed by the fire. 33 The day after the fire was finally extinguished,
the Chicago Tribune declared, “Cheer Up . . . looking upon the
ashes of thirty years’ accumulations, the people of this once beautiful
city have resolved that CHICAGO SHALL RISE AGAIN.” 34
William H. Carter, the president and one of three commissioners of
the city’s Board of Public Works, wrote his brother on October 15,
1871, stating, “Our beautiful city is in ruins. The greatest calamity
30. NYC Office of Mayor, supra note 23.
31. Id.
32. Kevin Rozario, Making Progress: Disaster Narratives and the Art of Optimism in
Modern America, in THE RESILIENT CITY: HOW MODERN CITIES RECOVER FROM DISASTER
28 (Lawrence J. Vale & Thomas J. Campanella eds., 2005).
33. Id.
34. The Chicago Fire, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 1871, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/chi-chicagodays-fire-story,0,2790977.story.
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that ever befell a city is upon us.” 35 But after recounting the events of
the fire, Carter employed a metaphor to describe what would happen
next: “Chicago is burned down but not despairing—she has the
energy and push and will rise phoenix like from the ashes.” 36
On the morning of April 18, 1906, San Francisco experienced
what is now estimated to be a 7.8 magnitude earthquake. 37 The
earthquake destroyed “some of the city’s frailer structures,” but the
majority of the damage was done by fires that followed the
earthquake and burned through the city for three days. 38 Over 80%
of the city was destroyed. At the time, approximately 700 deaths
were reported, but the actual death toll has been estimated to be
more than 3,000. 39 More than half of the city’s 400,000 residents
were without shelter. 40 Despite the destruction, George Harvey, the
editor of Harper’s, expressed a common sentiment, assuring
subscribers that the city was “certain to arise quickly from its ashes,
greater and more beautiful than ever.” 41 San Francisco had, in fact,
risen from the ashes after fires and earthquakes—although none as
devastating as the 1906 earthquake—so many times that the symbol
on the San Francisco city flag was a phoenix rising from the ashes. 42
The image of the phoenix rising from the ashes is a metaphor
that easily lends itself to cities destroyed by fire, but the metaphor is
more complex than just recovering from fire. The phoenix, a bird in
Egyptian mythology, lived for five hundred years before burning
itself on a sacrificial fire. From that fire sprung a new, young
phoenix, which would in turn live for five hundred years before

35. Letter from William H. Carter, President, Chicago Board of Public Works, to His
Brother (Oct. 15, 1871), available at http://www.greatchicagofire.org/conflagrationlibrary/william-h-carter-tells-his-brother-sad-news.
36. Id.
37. See Rozario, supra note 32, at 28. See also Phillip W. Stoffer, The San Andreas Fault
in the San Francisco Bay Area, California: A Geology Fieldtrip Guidebook to Selected Stops on
Public Lands (2005), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2005/1127/chapter1.pdf.
38. Rozario, supra note 32, at 28; see also Stoffer, supra note 37, at 5–6.
39. Stoffer, supra note 37, at 5–6. See also Kristi Finefield, San Francisco: Before and
After the 1906 Earthquake and Fire, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://blogs.loc.gov/picturethis/2012/04/san-francisco-before-and-after-the-1906earthquake-and-fire/.
40. Finefeld, supra note 39.
41. Rozario, supra note 32, at 31.
42. Finefield, supra note 39.
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burning itself in a never-ending cycle. 43 Over time, the phoenix
became a Christian symbol of resurrection and rebirth. 44 Although
the phoenix was mythical, the concrete image of rising from the
ashes drove both the cities of Chicago and San Francisco after their
respective disasters. Chicago was rebuilt within two years, with 5,000
makeshift buildings ready for use within a week of the fire. 45
“[E]very story about the fire testified[] that the death of Chicago
was actually the prerequisite for its more glorious rebirth,” 46
manifested by Chicago becoming the nation’s second-largest
metropolis by 1890. San Francisco was also quick to rebuild, with a
new city built within four years 47 and ready to host the Panama
Pacific International Exposition in 1915; “[i]n fact, rubble from the
1906 earthquake was used to create the land needed for the . . .
exposition’s impressive structures. On the ashes of the past, the city
rose again.” 48
While both cities were celebrated for rising like the phoenix from
the ashes, the metaphor fueled expectations of a recovery that was
immediate and the expectation that the cities would be as good as,
and in many cases better, than they were before the disasters. In
Chicago, the process of rebuilding claimed more lives than the fire,
“with as many as twelve construction workers dying each day
because of the need for speed and inattention to safety.” 49 In San
Francisco, rather than taking the time to consider how the new city
might be built, the city was rebuilt “at a rate and manner which
made the city not only less beautiful than was possible, but more
dangerous. The rubble of the 1906 disaster was pushed into the Bay;
buildings were built on it.” 50 It was feared that “[t]hose buildings
[would] be among the most vulnerable when the next earthquake
43. Phoenix Definition, OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD MYTHOLOGY (David
Leeming
ed.,
2005),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com.erl.lib.byu.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195156690.001
.0001/acref-9780195156690-e-1268?rskey=5lFj6N&result=1.
44. Id.
45. Rozario, supra note 32, at 29.
46. Rozario, supra note 32, at 36.
47. Id. at 29.
48. Finefield, supra note 39.
49. Rozario, supra note 32, at 41.
50. Rutherford H. Platt, Planning and Land Use Adjustments in Historical Perspective,
in COOPERATING WITH NATURE: CONFRONTING NATURAL HAZARDS WITH LAND-USE
PLANNING FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES 29, 34 (Robert J. Burby ed., 1998) (quoting G.
THOMAS & M. M. WITTS, THE SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE 274 (1971)).
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[came].” 51 San Francisco’s vulnerability was most clearly on display
eighty-three years later in the Loma Prieta earthquake. 52
The historical metaphor of the phoenix rising from the ashes
illustrates that what a disaster is compared to is already a part of the
culture of the people affected by the disaster—a conclusion which
continues in contemporary disaster metaphors. The phoenix had
been placed on the San Francisco flag in 1900, while the Christian
image of resurrection was a widely held belief in the United States in
the late 1800s. Chicago embraced this metaphor of resurrection, as
evidenced in the poem “Chicago” by John Greenleaf Whittier. 53
Whittier describes the fall of the city, concluding with “The City of
the West is dead!” before calling on the city to “Rise” and “from
thee throw / The ashen sackcloth of thy woe” in order to rebuild as
a manifestation of Christ’s humanity. 54 Once the nature of the
metaphor is established, we can see how the metaphor drives the
expectations and outcome of recovery.
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY METAPHOR: DISASTER AS WAR,
RECOVERY AS VICTORY
Aristotle said that “metaphors . . . must not be far-fetched;
rather, we must draw them from kindred and similar things; the
kinship must be seen the moment the words are uttered.” 55 Not only
must the things be “kindred,” but to understand the abstract, we
must compare the thing to something we already know and
understand. The cities of Chicago and San Francisco turned to the
mythical image of the phoenix and the Christian belief in
resurrection to envision their cities rising from the ashes. Since those
disasters, a new metaphor has come to the forefront to describe
disasters and conceptualize recovery: war and, after 9/11,

51. Id.
52. Platt, supra note 51 (“[T]he city’s Marina district, built on 1906 rubble, sustained
heavy damage in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.”); see also Stoffer, supra note 37
(comparing the 1906 and 1989 earthquakes).
53. John Greenleaf Whittier, Chicago, reprinted in JAMES W. SHEAHAN & GEORGE P.
UPTON, THE GREAT CONFLAGRATION OF CHICAGO: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 357,
357–58 (1872).
54. Id.
55. Gerald Lebovits, Not Mere Rhetoric: Metaphors and Similes, 74 N.Y. ST. B.A. J.
64, 64 (2002) (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 188 (Lane Cooper
trans., 1932)).
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terrorism. 56 The prevalence of war images, both in the news media
and popular culture, creates an easy comparison that will be quickly
understood after a natural disaster. And that comparison may be
accurate—there are similar forms of devastation in terms of lives lost
and property destroyed, and there may be a similar need for
resources in the aftermath. 57
War was one of the most consistently used metaphors that
became the narrative of Hurricane Katrina. 58 After touring the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour
said, “I can only imagine that this is what Hiroshima looked like 60
years ago.” 59 Similarly, war was used as a metaphor to describe the
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. Mayor Bloomberg said after
Hurricane Sandy that “[t]o describe it as looking like pictures we
have seen at the end of World War II is not overstating it.” 60 Those
affected by Hurricane Sandy have repeatedly described it as a “war
zone.” 61 Other disasters, including epidemics, wildfires, and
technological disasters, have also employed the metaphor and overall
rhetoric of war. 62 Lisa Grow Sun and RonNell Andersen Jones argue
that when natural disasters are compared to war and terrorism, or
56. See Sun & Jones, supra note 21; Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 213 (2013).
57. Pidot, supra note 56, at 221.
58. Sun & Jones, supra note 21, at 916.
59. U.S. Dealing with Katrina’s Wrath as Death Toll Soars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/world/americas/31ihtweb.0831kat.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
60. James Barron, After the Devastation, a Daunting Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/us/hurricane-sandy-barrels-region-leavingbattered-path.html?pagewanted%253Dall.
61. See, e.g., Chris Kirkham, Hurricane Sandy: In Connecticut, Storm Leaves Mess of
Downed Trees and Flooded Roadways, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/hurricane-sandyconnecticut_n_2044402.html (“‘This is like a war zone,’ Lynne Schuster said. ‘What are we
gonna do now?’”); Hurricane Sandy: Volunteering in a War Zone, ABC NEWS (Nov. 14,
2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/video/hurricane-sandy-volunteering-war-zone17715843 (“It looks like a war zone.”); Erik Wemple, Hurricane Sandy: TV stands by its live
shots, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erikwemple/post/hurricane-sandy-tv-stands-by-its-live-shots/2012/10/29/26923c56-21f511e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_blog.html (comparing getting live shots of Hurricane Sandy to
getting live shots in war zones and conflict areas).
62. Sun & Jones, supra note 21, at 920 (citation omitted) (noting that one
critic has stated, “the discourse of [wildland] fire management is thoroughly tainted
with war metaphors[] [f]rom terms such as ‘initial attack’ to the foundational
concept of ‘firefighting’”).
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when war rhetoric is used in relation to a natural disaster, it shapes
both the public perception of the disaster and the public officials’
response to the disaster. 63 Following this line of reasoning, when
disaster is compared to war, the process of disaster recovery is
perceived as being like recovering from war. Justin Pidot concludes
that, “Couching disaster in these [war] terms infuses disaster
response with a powerful symbolism. Rebuilding in the wake of a
disaster becomes an imperative. To do otherwise would be to
concede defeat.” 64
War as a metaphor for disaster prompts a rallying cry of
nationalism in recovery. After Hurricane Sandy, President Obama
repeatedly called on Americans to stand strong together: “America is
tougher, and we’re tougher because we pull together. We leave
nobody behind. We make sure that we respond as a nation and
remind ourselves that whenever an American is in need, all of us
stand together to make sure that we’re providing the help that’s
necessary.” 65 At the same time, war introduces a false dynamic to the
recovery process: nature as the aggressor and human populations as
victims. Placed in this dynamic, recovery becomes an act of victory,
of refusing to let nature win. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco
invoked this metaphor testifying before Congress after Hurricane
Katrina, stating, “After World War II our decision to rebuild Europe
was farsighted and courageous. History will treat us well if we
exhibit the same kind of political courage now.” 66 But where there
was a clear opponent and objective in World War II and a clear need
to rebuild, there was far more uncertainty after Hurricane Katrina:
the unfeeling forces of nature were an undefeatable enemy that could
return, the objective and definition of victory were unclear, and
rebuilding New Orleans would put the victims back in harm’s way.
The metaphor here shows how war and natural disaster, the two
things compared, are dissimilar: in war there is a conscious agent
we are responding to, one that we are invested in showing we are
strong in the face of their attacks, while natural disasters are the
result of a natural occurrence and the choices we have made in
63. Id. at 917 (“War rhetoric not only infused media reporting about Katrina but
also shaped public officials’ characterization of the disaster and the appropriate—that is,
military—response.”).
64. Pidot, supra note 56, at 224.
65. Obama, supra note 16.
66. Pidot, supra note 56, at 233 (citation omitted).
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terms of where to live, what to build, and so forth. By recognizing
these dissimilarities, there is the opportunity to adjust policy and
perceptions of disaster zones to more accurately assess what
happens next.
V.

THE FORGOTTEN METAPHOR: RECOVERY AS RESILIENCE

After Hurricane Sandy, President Obama signed an executive
order appointing a Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force. 67 In
August 2013, the task force released a rebuilding strategy subtitled
“Stronger Communities, A Resilient Region.” On a similar
timeline, Mayor Bloomberg formed the Special Initiative on
Resilience and Rebuilding, the result of which was a “roadmap for
producing a truly sustainable 21st century New York,” titled “A
Stronger, More Resilient New York.” 68 Throughout the discussion
of What happens next? the word resilience and its variations—
resilient and resiliency—were used to describe both the people who
lived in the affected areas and America as a whole. Two days after
Hurricane Sandy made landfall, New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie urged his state to not “permit that sorrow [of loss] to
replace the resilience that I know all New Jerseyans have. And so
we will get up and we’ll get this thing rebuilt, and we’ll put things
back together, because that’s what this state is all about and always
has been all about.” 69 In a speech to the Red Cross, President
Obama encouraged volunteers to “sustain that spirit of resilience”
necessary to rebuild after Hurricane Sandy, which he illustrated by
the story of a rescue swimmer sent by the Coast Guard to help save
a sinking ship off the coast of North Carolina. The swimmer
arrived at the boat and said, “I understand you guys need a ride.” 70
The illustration of being not only strong and capable, but also a
good neighbor, was how President Obama defined resilience.
67. HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING
STRATEGY:
STRONGER
COMMUNITIES,
A
RESILIENT
REGION
13
(2013),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=hsrebuildingstrategy.pdf.
68. Michael Bloomberg, Foreword from the Mayor, in PLANYC, A STRONGER, MORE
RESILIENT
NEW
YORK
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml.
69. Chris Christy, Governor of New Jersey, Remarks by the President and Governor
Christie after Surveying Damage from Hurricane Sandy (Oct. 31, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/10/31/remarks-president-andgovernor-christie-after-surveying-damage-hurricane).
70. Obama, supra note 16.
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The use of resilience to discuss disasters, while perhaps more
prominent after Hurricane Sandy, is nothing new. The words
resilient, resilience, and resiliency appear eleven times in the National
Response Framework (NRF) issued by the Department of
Homeland Security and fifty-six times in the National Disaster
Recovery Framework (NDRF), including in the name of one of nine
core NDRF principles. 71 The NRF outlines how the federal
government responds to all disasters and emergencies 72 and presents
the National Preparedness Goal, which “establishes the capabilities
and outcomes the Nation must accomplish across . . . five mission
areas [prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery] in
order to be secure and resilient.” 73 The NDRF is prepared by FEMA
and is designed as a companion to the NRF, “focus[ing] on how
best to restore, redevelop and revitalize the health, social, economic,
natural and environmental fabric of the community and build a more
resilient Nation.” 74 The NDRF defines resilience as the “[a]bility to
adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from
disruption due to emergencies” 75 and repeatedly invokes resiliency as
a goal of both disaster preparedness and recovery.
Use of the term resilience is not limited to the National Response
and Disaster Recovery Frameworks. The United Nations
international strategy for disaster reduction, the Hyogo Framework,
is subtitled “Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to
Disaster.” 76 In May 2012, the United Nations issued a “thematic
think piece” on disaster risk and resilience. 77 Each organization

71. NDRF, supra note 6, at 3–4.
72. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK i
(2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf.
73. Id. at 1.
74. NDRF, supra note 6, at 1.
75. Id. at 81.
76. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to
Disaster (2005), available at http://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/Ldocs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-english.pdf (hereinafter Hyogo Framework). The word
resilience and its variations appear twenty-four times. “The Conference provided a unique
opportunity to promote a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and
risks to hazards. It underscored the need for, and identified ways of, building the resilience of
nations and communities to disasters.” Id. at 1.
77. Disaster Risk and Resilience (hereinafter Disaster Risk), UN SYSTEM TASK TEAM ON
THE POST-2015 UN DEVELOPMENT AGENDA. The word resilience and its variations appear
twenty-five times.
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defined resilience differently. The Hyogo Framework employed a
2004 UN/ISDR definition of resilience as
The capacity of a system, community or society potentially
exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to
reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social
system is capable of organising [sic] itself to increase this capacity
for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to
improve risk reduction measures. 78

The UN’s May 2012 think piece defined resilience as “the ability
of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist,
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in
a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation
and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.” 79 The
previously mentioned rebuilding strategy prepared by the Hurricane
Sandy Rebuilding Task Force defined resilience as “the ability to
anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and
withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions.” 80
There is a common thread running through these four
definitions. Each definition identifies resilience as an ability—or, in
the Hyogo Framework, a capacity—“in a person or thing which
makes an action possible; suitable or sufficient power or proficiency;
capability, [or] capacity to do . . . something.” 81 What that ability is,
however, changes or multiplies in characteristics with each definition.
It is the ability to adapt, withstand, and rapidly recover; the ability to
resist or change; the ability to organize; the ability to resist, absorb,
accommodate, and recover; and the ability to anticipate, prepare,
respond, and recover. And what people, communities, and nations
are supposed to adapt, withstand, respond, and recover from changes
with each definition. 82 When New York City employed the definition
of resilient in its post-Hurricane Sandy report, “A Stronger, More
Resilient New York,” it whittled down the definition to a rallying
78. Hyogo Framework, supra note 76, at 4 n. 7.
79. Disaster Risk, supra note 77, at 3 n.1.
80. HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, supra note 67, at 169.
81. Ability Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014) (emphasis in original).
82. Fiona Tweed & Gordon Walker, Some Lessons for Resilience from the 2011 Multidisaster in Japan, 16 LOCAL ENV’T 937, 938 (2011) (“This frenzy of ‘resilience-speak’ has at
times been rather uncritical and unreflective in character, with insufficient questioning of
exactly what it means to be resilient and for whom resilience is needed.”).
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cry: “1. Able to bounce back after change or adversity. 2. Capable of
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from difficult
conditions. Syn.: TOUGH. See also: New York City.” 83
What these definitions do not include is that resilience is a
metaphor and, like the metaphors previously discussed, establishes an
understanding and creates expectations for recovery. 84 Recognizing
that resilience functions as a metaphor may complicate its definition,
but reading it as a metaphor will also expand our understanding of
resiliency, especially as applied to disasters. Over the past decade, 85
resilience has gone from being an attention-getting buzzword in
oratories to a core factor in local, national, and international disaster
planning. 86 With each use in government planning, academic essays,
newspaper reports, and online blogs, the definition of resilience
becomes something slightly different, changing with the speaker and
with the audience addressed. 87 Comparing resilience to disaster
preparation, response, and recovery creates a dialogue for scholars to
address, for example, whether a community should “bounce back”
or “bounce forward” after a disaster; whether a community that is
resilient recovers in the same way as a community that is vulnerable;
and whether resiliency can only be seen in hindsight. In order to
understand the metaphor, it is necessary to consider both the origins
83. Bloomberg, supra note 68, at cover.
84. Fran H. Norris et al. notes that “[w]hen applied to people and their environments,
‘resilience’ is fundamentally a metaphor,” and suggests that, in hindsight, “the social and
psychological sciences should have created their own language, free from inherent meanings,
but the term is probably here to stay.” Fran H. Norris et al., Community Resilience as a
Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster Readiness, 41 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOLOGY 127, 127–28 (2008).
85. Siambabala Bernard Manyena, Geoff O’Brien, Phil O’Keefe & Joanne Rose,
Editorial, Disaster resilience: a bounce back or bounce forward ability?, 16 LOCAL ENV’T, May
2011, at 417. (“The disaster resilience paradigm has gained currency since the start of the
new millennium.”).
86. K. Crowley & J.R. Elliott, Earthquake Disasters and resilience in the global North:
Lessons from New Zealand and Japan, 178 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 208, 209 (2012). (“This
constructive ‘buzz’ word echoes down the corridors of universities, humanitarian agencies and
governments across the global North uniting elements of disaster risk reduction.”).
87. SUSAN L. CUTTER ET AL., COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL RESILIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM HAZARDS, DISASTERS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 1 (2008)
(stating that “there is no common definition of resilience”). See also, Crowley & Elliott, supra
note 86, at 208–09 (“[R]esilience and vulnerability are central concepts in understanding
disasters; despite this, resilience is often poorly defined.”); Tweed & Walker, supra note 82, at
937 (“Resilience has become a widely enrolled concept and objective for governance, applied
to a broad suite of potential shocks to the conduct and organization of ‘normal’ life.”)
(citations omitted).
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and appropriations of resilience. This will in turn lead to a better
understanding of how resilience can be used to approach disasters
holistically, from disaster preparation to recovery and rebuilding after
a disaster.
A. The Definitions of Resilience
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) offers five definitions
of resilience, 88 three of which are applicable to this discussion. The
first and oldest definition of resilience is “[t]he action or act of
rebounding or springing back; rebound, recoil.” 89 Contemporary
discussions of disaster resilience refashion this definition as an
ability to “bounce back.” 90 Both the original definition and the
contemporary definition suggest two key components of a disaster
resilience metaphor: a return to normalcy and the speed at which
normalcy is achieved. There may also be the expectation that a
community will not just recover from a disaster, but that the
community will return to the state it was in before the disaster.
The ramifications of this definition will be addressed in Part B of
this section.
The second OED definition of resilience applicable to disaster
policy is “[e]lasticity,” or in mechanical terms, “[t]he energy per
unit volume absorbed by a material when it is subjected to
strain; the value of this at the elastic limit.” 91 Again there is the
suggestion of “bounce back,” 92 but there is also a force exerted
on the object causing strain. A disaster is not simply the result of
an event occurring in nature, but the force of that event exerted
on a community. 93
[M]ost serious students of disaster have moved from defining a
disaster as the hazardous event itself to defining a disaster in terms
of the impact that the hazardous event has on people and
property—an impact that is determined not only by the magnitude
88. Resilience Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014).
89. Id.
90. Manyena et al., supra note 85.
91. Resilience Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014).
92. CUTTER ET AL., supra note 87, at 4 (“Elasticity (or the ability to bounce back or
rebound) is a common adjective used to described [sic] resilient systems or communities.”).
93. Crowley & Elliott, supra note 86, at 208 (“A disaster is . . . more than just the
occurrence of a hazard event; it is the preventable loss of lives and elements of value that
cripple a country and have a global resonance.”) (citations omitted).
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of the event, but also by human interaction with nature, by our
choices about where and how we live. 94

The last OED definition of resilience aligns more closely with
contemporary disaster resilience definitions: “[t]he quality or fact of
being able to recover quickly or easily from, or resist being affected
by, a misfortune, shock, illness, etc.; robustness; adaptability.” 95 This
definition, however, was first applied to disciplines as varied as
physics, mathematics, and psychology before being extended to
disaster resilience. 96 This demonstrates how one concrete concept—
resilience—can become a metaphor for any number of abstract ideas.
When this happens, however, it is important to carefully consider
how the original concrete concept is both similar and dissimilar to
the abstract idea that is being defined. The various definitions of
resilience in disaster recovery can be explained in part because the
definitions are an amalgam of the original definitions of resilience
and resilience as a metaphor in psychology or urban planning. While
these metaphors contribute to disaster recovery, they are removed
one step from the subject at hand, and should only supplement the
metaphor of “disaster recovery is like resilience,” rather than
overshadowing or even supplanting it.
B. What Resilience Is and Is Not
Simply invoking resilience necessarily creates a comparison
between actual resilience—“the capacity of a material or system to
return to equilibrium after a displacement” 97—and disaster resilience,
which exposes the ways communities, infrastructure, etc., cannot
return to equilibrium after disasters. But scholars have found it
necessary to create further comparisons when describing disaster
resilience, primarily by pairing it with vulnerability. There are those
who describe resilience and vulnerability as two sides of the same
coin, 98 while others place resilience and vulnerability on opposite
94. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 3 (2d ed. 2010); see also
Pidot, supra note 56, at 215 (“These events are referred to as ‘natural’ disasters because
they are precipitated by natural forces. But the behavior of humans—where we locate and
how we build our homes, businesses, and roads—plays a leading role in transforming events
into disasters.”).
95. Resilience Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014).
96. Norris et al., supra note 84, at 127–28.
97. Id. at 127.
98. Manyena et al., supra note 85, at 418.

168

JENKINS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

151

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

What Happens Next: Metaphor in Disaster Recovery Policy

poles of the same continuum “with vulnerability being negative and
resilience being positive.” 99 In both illustrations, the assumption is
made that when resilience is being addressed, vulnerability is also
part of the conversation, as the presence of the one suggests the
absence of the other. 100
Like resilience, the definition of vulnerability varies with the
speaker and audience; however, for the purpose of this discussion, it
will suffice to turn first to the OED, which defines vulnerability as
“the quality or state of being vulnerable” 101 and vulnerable as “that
may be wounded; susceptible of receiving wounds or physical
injury.” 102 In the context of disaster policy:
Vulnerability is the pre-event, inherent characteristics or qualities of
systems that create the potential for harm or differential ability to
recover following an event. Vulnerability is a function of the
exposure (who or what is at risk) and the sensitivity of the system
(the degree to which people and places can be harmed). 103

B.E. Aguirre argues that vulnerability is synonymous with
“exhaustion, impotence, weakness, or exposure to harm.” 104
Aguirre posits that vulnerability and resilience are neither
complementary nor dichotomous, but are dialectical in nature. 105
According to Aguirre, “[b]oth vulnerabilities and resilience are
temporary and incomplete elements of a permanent social change
process which impacts on the adaptability of such systems and which
can be conceptualized using a dialectical logic of transformation.” 106
Following the Hegelian theory of dialectics, a thesis—here
vulnerability—is presented and answered by its antithesis—
resilience—resulting in a synthesis or a solution to the problem.
However, once a synthesis is formed, it becomes the new thesis,
exposing new vulnerabilities that must be answered. While the

99.
100.

Id.
Id. See also B. E. Aguirre, Dialectics of Vulnerability and Resilience, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2007) (“[A]s in the case of the relationship between trust and
control . . . , ‘each assume the existence of the other, refer to each other and create each other,
but remain irreducible to each other.’”).
101. Vulnerability Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014).
102. Vulnerable Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014).
103. CUTTER ET AL., supra note 87, at 2.
104. Aguirre, supra note 100, at 41–42.
105. Id. at 39.
106. Id. at 44.
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obvious response to a vulnerable community or system is an effort to
become more resilient, “[i]nherent in the very solution meant to
bring about temporary adaptation is the creation of new and
frequently unanticipated vulnerabilities, resulting in the need for new
efforts at mitigation and resilience.” 107 Perhaps the best illustration of
the dialectic or at least the tension between resilience and
vulnerability are the stories of communities thought to be resilient.
In 2011, two earthquakes revealed that even a resilient community
can be vulnerable. 108
The first was the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand in
February 2011. New Zealand has a history of earthquakes, evident
not just by the numbers of known earthquakes, but also by the
inclusion of Ruaumoko, the god of earthquakes, in Maori
mythology. New Zealand is considered one of the most earthquake
resilient societies, with comprehensive earthquake preparation taught
in schools and strict building code by-laws for earthquake-prone
housing in place since 1935. 109 Despite its level of preparation,
Christchurch was blindsided by a previously hidden and infrequently
active fault. 110 When a 6.3 magnitude earthquake occurred directly
underneath the city center, it shook more than the earth. The area
was still recovering from a September 2010 earthquake and its
aftershocks, resulting in greater damage than would normally be
anticipated by an earthquake this size. The February 2011 quake was
the second-deadliest earthquake in New Zealand’s recorded history,
killing 185 people. To protect the surviving population, city officials
cordoned off the city center as a public exclusion zone from
February 23, 2011, the day after the earthquake, to June 30, 2013,
859 days after the earthquake. 111 In the days following the

107. Id. at 43.
108. Crowley & Elliott, supra note 86, at 208.
109. Id. at 212.
110. Id. (A similar earthquake—one from a previously hidden fault line—but at a larger
magnitude, 7, occurred in September 2010. Known as the Darfield earthquake, the “rupture
broke the surface and laterally offset roads, hedges and fences by up to 4 m[eters]. However,
this earthquake occurred 40 km to the west of Christchurch, and no deaths occurred in the
city or outside.”).
111. Sarah-Jane O’Connor, Our Job Here is Done, Soldiers Say, FAIRFAX NZ NEWS (June
28,
2013,
5:00
AM),
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurchearthquake/8851961/Our-job-here-is-done-soldiers-say.
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earthquake, 50% of the buildings within the city center were
designated for demolition, 112 leaving a gaping hole in the city center.
From the Christchurch earthquake come two important
observations about resilient communities: Despite the earthquake’s
surprise location in the city center, Christchurch’s designed resiliency
to other, more distant earthquakes did help the city—although a
large number of buildings were demolished, “the important thing
was that they stood long enough for occupants to safely evacuate.” 113
And while the number of deaths was startling to the New Zealand
public, the fatality rate was 0.06% in an event “in which a third of a
million [people] experienced severe shaking.” 114 This statistic,
however, leads to the second observation in the form of a question
that was asked after the Christchurch earthquake: “But is this an
acceptable risk for a resilient community”? 115
The Christchurch community had been prepared to withstand an
earthquake, but not one directly under the city. In this way, a
resilient community became vulnerable, lacking the flexibility in
some instances to consider, adapt to, or prepare for an unknown
threat of disaster. In the months after the earthquake, Crowley and
Elliott wondered “if by creating a resilient community you produce
an incapacity for accepting even a small degree of risk, then how can
that community understand and accept the inherent uncertainties of
earthquakes?” 116 This question directs our attention back to the
nature of the resiliency-vulnerability dialectic. It requires a constant
conversation between thesis (vulnerabilities) and antithesis
(resilience) to create what we consider a resilient community. If the
conversation stops once a community believes itself to be resilient,
the community becomes vulnerable by not continuing to improve or
consider new possibilities.
Four years later, the narrative of the Christchurch earthquake is
divided between those who stayed and continued to be a resilient
community, and those who could not overcome the newly
discovered vulnerabilities. 117 According to the 2013 census,
112. Crowley & Elliott, supra note 86, at 212.
113. Id. at 213.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Alison Prato, Earthquake-induced PTSD: What Life is Like Now in Christchurch,
New Zealand, TED BLOG (Nov. 21, 2013), http://blog.ted.com/2013/11/21/earthquake-
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approximately 7,000 residents left Christchurch following the
earthquake. 118 While only a fraction of the approximately 376,700
living in Christchurch before the earthquake, there is still a concern
that a younger generation is leaving, while the population over the
age of 50 is increasing. 119 Those who stayed watched the government
demolish, rather than improve, buildings that had been damaged in
the city center. 120
Three weeks after the Christchurch earthquake, the second
significant earthquake of 2011 occurred in Japan, another area
known for its seismic resilience. “[N]ow listed as the fourth largest
earthquake to be recorded globally in over a century,” the Tohoku
earthquake killed over 20,000 people and “generated a tsunami that
tore across the flat plains of eastern Japan devastating thousands of
communities.” 121 Japan’s resilience can be seen in its response to the
earthquake, 122 as well as in strict building codes, well-rehearsed
emergency drills, and a society prepared to experience earthquakes. 123
In becoming resilient to earthquakes, however, Japan had made
itself vulnerable in other ways. Most buildings were built from
flexible materials and were single story, designed to move with and
withstand an earthquake; that same design made the structures
vulnerable to the extreme waves of the tsunami. 124 A second
vulnerability was exposed at Fukushima, when the “earthquake and
tsunami damage destabilised [sic] the operation of a complex of
nuclear reactors, leading to partial meltdown and the release of
radioactive material. The impacts of both events then hampered
attempts to bring the nuclear risks under control due to the loss of

induced-ptsd-what-life-is-like-now-in-christchurch-newzealand/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+TEDBlog
+%28 TEDBlog%29 (“In the aftermath of the quake, the people of Christchurch went two
different ways. Some came together, while others fell apart.”).
118. Id.
119. Christchurch’s Population Loss Slows, SCOOP INDEP. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012, 11:11
AM),
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/AK1210/S00598/christchurchs-population-lossslows.htm.
120. Prato, supra note 117.
121. Crowley & Elliott, supra note 86, at 213.
122. Id. (“Within 8 seconds of the first earthquake waves arriving, warnings were
issued across the country and 27 high-speed ‘bullet’ trains were stopped without a
single derailment.”).
123. Id.
124. Tweed & Walker, supra note 82, at 939.
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power and transport infrastructure.” 125 The nuclear risks in turn
impeded the rescue and recovery efforts in response to the initial
threats of the earthquake and tsunami.
The 2011 Christchurch and Tohoku earthquakes show that a
disaster resilient community can still be vulnerable, and those
vulnerabilities may require new ways of conceptualizing resiliency. 126
It should be an ongoing dialogue, where “the ability to live with
hazards requires a level of acceptable risk and crucially an
understanding of the uncertainties related to hazards.” 127 Ultimately,
vulnerability is not a complement to resilience, but part of the
process in developing resilience, exposed in the terms of the
metaphor by how the community is not resilient. 128 As Aguirre states:
Resilience is partly a recursive function of conscious awareness,
planning, and training that anticipates or responds to the presence
of vulnerabilities and tries to mitigate and provide solutions to
them. These are all dimensions of resilient systems. Resilient actions
do not merely reflect the capacity of systems to reconstitute
themselves as they existed prior to the crisis, but show a system’s
ability to absorb, respond, recover, and reorganize from an
internally or externally induced set of demands which reveal the
presence of vulnerability and bring about mitigation efforts. 129

In revealing the presence of vulnerability, however,
governments and communities are required to determine “who or
what is to be made resilient” and just how that will be

125. Id. at 938.
126. See Aguirre, supra note 100, at 43 (“Past experiences cannot be used as the only
source of information to anticipate new risks. Imagination, creativity, and careful historical
reconstructions of past disastrous events, including both cross national and international
scientific assessments of major crises and disasters, are needed to attempt to anticipate and
prevent new risks’ effects.”).
127. Crowley & Elliott, supra note 86, at 214.
128. See, e.g., Anita Chandra et al., Getting Actionable About Community Resilience:
The Los Angeles County Community Disaster Resilience Project, 103 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH
1181, 1182 (2013) (defining resilience in the context of public health emergency
preparedness as “[t]he ongoing and developing capacity of the community to account for its
vulnerabilities and develop capabilities that aid in: preventing , withstanding, and mitigating
the stress of an incident; recovering in a way that restores the community to self-sufficiency
and at least the same level of health and social functioning as before the incident; and using
knowledge from the response to strengthen the community’s ability to withstand the next
incident”) (emphasis added).
129. Aguirre, supra note 100, at 43.
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accomplished. 130 For example, one response in Japan to the danger
of tsunamis and the possible failure of sea walls would be to build
on higher ground; this measure to establish resiliency, however,
would expose a new vulnerability—the risk of landslides generated
by typhoon rainfall—“replacing resilience to one form of risk with
vulnerability to another.” 131
VI. CONCLUSION
Before the metaphor of resilience was applied to disaster policy, it
was introduced in urban development and planning in the form of
the “resilient city.” 132 Surveying the history of cities, between 1100
and 1800,
only forty-two cities worldwide were permanently abandoned
following destruction . . . . By contrast, cities such as Baghdad,
Moscow, Aleppo, Mexico City, and Budapest lost between 60 and
90 percent of their populations due to wars during this period, yet
they were rebuilt and eventually rebounded. After about 1800,
such resilience became a nearly universal fact of urban settlement
around the globe. 133

In spite of both natural and man-made disasters—or perhaps
because of—it is “exceedingly rare for a major city to be truly or
permanently lost.” 134
Resilience is more than policy—it is a fact of life. Recovery after
disaster will happen, whether that means rising from the ashes or
fighting against Mother Nature. Instead of What happens next?, the
question becomes How will what happens next happen? Both the
federal government and New York City are attempting to answer
that question after Hurricane Sandy through rebuilding plans

130.

Tweed & Walker, supra note 82, at 940.
Knowing that there is an array of potential hazard interactions in a
particular place may call for effective multi-hazard governance, but the
difficulties involved in building resilience are highlighted through the
choices that have to be made—who or what is to be made resilient and by
what approaches or sets of methods?
131. Id.
132. Lawrence J. Vale & Thomas J. Campanella, Introduction: The Cities Rise Again, in
THE RESILIENT CITY: HOW MODERN CITIES RECOVER FROM DISASTER (Lawrence J. Vale &
Thomas J. Campanella eds., 2005).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 5.

174

JENKINS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

151

11/18/2015 2:13 PM

What Happens Next: Metaphor in Disaster Recovery Policy

emphasizing resilience; but if we only give resilience the strength of a
dictionary definition, the power of perception earned through
metaphor is lost. The metaphor of resilience shows us what is
possible; the action of springing back, elasticity, or the ability to
recover quickly as applied to recovery from natural disasters is a
starting point but not an ending. Looking at resilience as a
metaphor, rather than a definition, allows us to also see our
vulnerabilities, to recognize what is not resilient. It reveals how
recovery must be different from the concrete idea that is resilience.
Where resilience returns a material to its original position, we must
recognize that after a disaster, the rebuilding process inevitably
creates something new. 135
Sarah E. Jenkins*

135. See Rozario, supra note 32, at 42–43 (Despite having rebuilt the city as it was
before the 1906 earthquake, at least one San Francisco resident felt that “[t]he old San
Francisco is dead . . . . It may rebuild; it probably will; but those who have known that peculiar
city by the Golden Gate and have caught its flavor of the Arabian Nights feel that it can never
be the same. When it rises out of its ashes it will probably resemble other modern cities and
have lost its old strange flavor.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
* Brigham Young University, JD 2015. Many thanks to Professor Lisa Grow Sun, Professor
Kimberly Johnson, Allyson Jones, and Robert Patterson.
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